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Court of Justice of the European Communities
Frans van Heemstra* and Guy Suermondt**
T HE COURT OF JUSTICE of the European Communities func-
tions under the treaties establishing the European Economic
Community (hereinafter referred to as EEC), the Steel Commu-
nity (hereinafter ECCS), and the European Community of
Atomic Energy.' In connection therewith, a convention was con-
cluded relating to certain institutions common to the three Euro-
pean Communities, and providing for a single court for them.
The role of the Court under Article 1642 is to assure the
rule of law in the Community in the interpretation and appli-
cation of the Treaty. The Court, and its predecessor under the
ECCS, has, in the course of these ten years, created an important
body of European Community Law, which derives not only from
the Treaties establishing the European Communities but also
from general principles of the laws of the Member States.3 When
the Treaty is silent, the Court applies these general principles of
law; indeed, the Court would fail in its duties under the Treaty
if it refused to decide a case because of lack of a specific rule
or unclearness or incompleteness of its provisions.
4
The Executive Institutions of the Community are the Coun-
cil of Ministers and the Commission. Under Article 189, they can
act by: a) "regulations," which have general application and are
binding and directly applicable in each Member State; b) "di-
rectives," which bind the Member State to which they are ad-
dressed; c) "decisions," which are binding on the addressees; and
d) "recommendations" and "opinions," which have no binding
effect. Article 190 provides that regulations, directives, and de-
cisions must state reasons.
The jurisdiction of the Court is, in some respects, that of
an administrative court, determining the "objective legality" of
* Of the law firm of Abberley, Kooiman, Amon & Marcellino of New York
City.
**Juriste-Conseil; D. E. S., Sorbonne (France).
1 On October 7, 1958 the Court replaced a predecessor, which functioned
since December 4, 1952 under the ECCS.
2 References are to Articles of the EEC Treaty unless otherwise stated.
3 Hauts Forneaux v. High Authority, July 21, 1958, REC. IV, Page 223;
SNUPAT v. High Authority, March 22, 1961, REC. VII-2, Page 146; Mannes-
mann v. High Authority, 19-61, July 13, 1962, REC. VIII, Pages 675-709.
4 Algera v. High Authority, July 12, 1957, REC. III, Pages 80, 115.
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acts, or refusals to act, of the Institutions of the Community. On
the other hand, the Court may also act as a regular law court
adjudicating issues of contract and tort. In addition it may ren-
der "preliminary" decisions on questions submitted to it by the
national courts of the Member States involving the Treaties.
The Action for Annulment
Articles 173 and 174 provide for annulment of acts of the
Executive Institutions of the Community if they are illegal. A
Member State, the Council, or the Commission may appeal to
the Court to review the legality of such acts on the ground of:
a) lack of competence; b) failure to observe important require-
ments of form; c) violation of a rule of law of the Community;
or d) abuse of authority. The action must be brought within
two months from the date of publication of the act, or its noti-
fication to the party concerned. The appeal against a regulation
is open only to the Member States and the Institutions, but not
to private parties. Private parties may appeal against decisions
addressed to them, and also, against decisions which have the
mere appearance of a regulation, or are addressed to another, if
they are of direct and specific interest to the petitioner.5
The Court has found lack of competence where there was
unauthorized delegation of authority by an Institution. The Court
has held that such delegation is generally prohibited because it
tends to disturb the balance which the Treaty has tried to estab-
lish between the various administrative bodies.6 Failure to ob-
serve important requirements of form is a particularly weighty
ground for annulment, because of the duty under Article 190
to give reasons for a decision, which the Court considers to be
a requirement of form. The reasons must be specific and must
mention the bases for the findings of fact; such facts must logi-
cally support the particular decision.7 However, since the duty
to give reasons is one of form, in testing compliance with this
duty, it is irrelevant whether the opinion is, in fact, correct.
In principle, an annulment operates against all the world
5 Confederation Nationale v. Council, Cases No. 16, 17, 19 to 22-62, Decem-
ber 17, 1962, REC. VIII, Pages 901, 943.
6 Meroni v. High Authority, June 13, 1958, REC. IV, Page 9.
7 Geitling v. High Authority, March 20, 1957, REC. RI, Page 9; Nold v. High
Authority, March 20, 1959, REC. V, 1958-59, Page 63; President & Others v.
High Authority, July 15, 1960, REC. VI-2, Page 857; Netherlands Govern-
ment v. High Authority, March 21, 1955, REC. I, Page 201.
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and its effect is retroactive. Because such result may conflict
with the principle of certainty of the law, an illegal regulation
or decision will be voided only after the relative interests in-
volved have been carefully examined and only if the decision
is not too old.s The evaluation of these interests is the respon-
sibility of the Institution which, under Article 176, must give
effect to the judgment of annulment; the Court is limited to stat-
ing the legal principle involved. Article 174 gives the Court the
unorthodox power to indicate, where it deems this necessary,
what effects of an annulled regulation shall remain.
The Defense of Inapplicability of the Regulation on the Ground
of Illegality.
Under Article 184 any party before the Court may chal-
lenge the legality of a regulation on any one of the grounds pro-
vided for in Article 173. The defense may be raised even though
the period of two months required under Article 173 has ex-
pired. It may be raised by a private party who could not have
challenged the regulation in an action for annulment. Its sole
purpose is to protect the party involved against application of
an illegal regulation without the regulation itself being affected
by the action; its validity having become unimpeachable after
the expiration of the two month period of Article 173.9
Action for Failure of an Institution to Act
Article 173 would not be completely effective if an Institu-
tion could, by refusal to act, shirk its responsibilities under the
Treaty. Therefore, under Article 175 Member States, Institutions
of the Community, and private persons may bring an action to
establish such failure to act by the Council or the Commission.
The Institution must previously have been invited to act and
must have neglected to do so for a period of at least two months
after such invitation. The action must then be brought within
two months.
8 SNUPAT v. High Authority, Joint Cases 42, 49-59; March 22, 1961, REC.
VII, Pages 101, 159, 160.
9 Woerman & Lutticke v. Commission, Joint Cases No. 31 & 33-62, Decision
December 14, 1962, REC. VIII, Page 965.
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Full Jurisdiction as to the Merits
In addition to its jurisdiction as an administrative court con-
trolling the "objective" legality of administrative acts, the Court
of Justice also has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits actions
involving "subjective" personal rights of a contractual or tort
nature, referred to in the Treaty as "Recours de pleine juri-
diction," a term derived from French Administrative law. In
the specific instances provided by the Treaty, the Court has the
powers of an ordinary judge to examine all facts and circum-
stances surrounding the subjective right which is sought to be
enforced and may give such relief as it deems just. Although
the characteristics of the action for annulment and the action
"de pleine juridiction" are different in principle, these differ-
ences should not be exaggerated in practice. The action for
annulment may also require an examination of the facts and
circumstances determining the legality of the act; on the other
hand, the action with full jurisdiction involving a Treaty viola-
tion by a Member State may very well be limited to examination
of the legality of the State's conduct. However, in a specific case
one should always remain aware of the basic differences between
the two types of action.
Review of Sanctions
Under Article 172, regulations may confer on the Court full
jurisdiction as to the merits in connection with fines and penalties
levied pursuant to violations thereof. Accordingly, Article 17 of
Regulation 17 provides for an appeal of decisions of the Commis-
sion fixing a fine or penalty, and the Court may cancel, reduce
or increase these.
It should be noted that under Article 184 parties may al-
ways object to the application of a regulation, including its
penalty provisions, for illegality of the regulation on one of the
grounds contained in Article 173.
Treaty Violation by Member States
Under Articles 169 and 170, the Court has full jurisdiction to
adjudicate a complaint of either the Commission or of a Mem-
ber State directed against a Member State for failure to fulfill
any of its obligations under the Treaty. Under Article 169, the
Commission must first propose a remedy for the violation to the
Jan., 1964
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Member State involved. If such state does not comply, the Com-
mission may then refer the matter to the Court of Justice. 10
Under Article 170, if one Member State considers that
another Member State has violated the Treaty, it may refer
the matter to the Commission which in effect becomes a court of
first instance. If the complainant is not satisfied by the Com-
mission's opinion, or if no such opinion is forthcoming within a
period of three months, it may bring an appeal to the Court.
While Article 171 provides that if the Court finds a violation,
the errant State must implement the decision of the Court, no
penalties are provided. Thus the matter is dependent on volun-
tary compliance by the Member States.
Tort Actions
Under Article 178 the Court may adjudicate complaints in
tort relating to payment for damages which are caused by the
Institutions or their agents. Although reference is made to the
general principles of administrative tort law common to the
Member States, these in fact differ considerably among the
states. In its jurisprudence under the ECCS Treaty the Court
has developed a pragmatic approach, weighing the duties and
responsibilities of the administration and the interests to be
protected against the degree and character of the negligent act.'1
For example, liability for negligent service (faute de service)
and anonymous direct liability of the administration without
necessity to identify the agent who acted, have both been
adopted from French Administrative Law.
Jurisdiction to Give Preliminary Decisions on Questions
Submitted by National Courts
Article 177 of the Treaty authorizes the Court to give pre-
liminary decisions concerning the interpretation of the Treaty,
the validity and interpretation of Acts of the Institutions, and the
interpretation of the statutes of administrative bodies set up by
the Council. A national court or tribunal of one of the Member
States may, if in its opinion the matter before it depends on an
interpretation of the Treaty, request the Court of Justice to rule
10 Commission v. Republic of Italy, Case No. 10-61, February 27, 1962, REC.
VIII, Page 1.
11 Meroni v. High Authority, Case No. 14-60, July 31, 1961, REC. VII, Page
319, opinion Advocate General, Page 347.
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thereon. If the national court is one of last resort, it must refer
the preliminary question to the Court of Justice. Pursuant to
Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute to the Court of Justice,
the reference of the preliminary question to the Court suspends
the proceedings of the national court.
The first case to come before the Court under Article 177
involved the question of the interpretation of Article 85 para-
graph 1.12 It was referred to the Court of Justice by the Court
of Appeal of the Hague, the Netherlands and the question was
whether Articles 85 to 90 of the Treaty, containing the Rules of
Competition, were directly applicable to the nationals of a Mem-
ber State even though no regulations under Article 87 had been
issued.
The Court of Justice, considering that the national law and
the law of the Community are two distinct and different legal
orders, ruled that it had jurisdiction because Article 177 requires
merely that a request for a preliminary decision be made by a
court of a Member State, and it is irrelevant that under the
national law this decision to make the request is not final.
It was argued that this was not a request for interpretation
of Article 177 but rather involved the application of the Treaty
to a specific case. But the Court held that Article 177 allows
the national court to state its question in direct and simple form;
so the Court of Justice is within the limits of its authority, so
long as the issue involves interpretation of the Treaty. The
question submitted, whether a private contract violated the terms
of the Treaty, was held to be such a question of interpretation.
However since an examination of the facts is not within the
competence of the Court of Justice deciding under Article 177
the Court limited itself to a general interpretation of the Treaty
provision in issue.
The next case arising under Article 177 established that na-
tionals of the Member States are granted enforceable rights
under the Treaty, and can raise the preliminary question before
their national courts and thereby force these courts to ask for
a preliminary decision from the Court of Justice. This case, Van
Gend and E. N. Loos against Tarief Commissie 13 was referred
to the Court by the Tarief Commissie, the tribunal of last resort
12 De Geus v. Bosch and Van Ryn, April 6, 1962, REC. VIII, Pages 89, 130,
134.
13 Case No. 26-62, Decision Feb. 5, 1963, REC. IX, Page 1.
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concerning import duties in the Netherlands. The question was
whether Article 12 of the Treaty prohibiting increase in custom
duties, had such internal effect that it could be invoked by the
petitioner in its objection to payment of the duty, in the proceed-
ing before the Tariff Commission.
As to its jurisdiction the Court brushed aside the objec-
tions that: (a) it had no authority under Article 177 since the
question was one of constitutional law of the Netherlands con-
cerning its Treaty 14 obligations; and that (b) in the event of
violation of a provision of the EEC Treaty by a Member State,
only the Commission or another Member State could complain
under Articles 169 or 170. The Court held the sole requirement
for its jurisdiction is that the question concerns the interpreta-
tion of the Treaty.
As to the merits, the court reasoned that the purpose of the
EEC Treaty, to institute a common market, must affect the sub-
jects of the Community directly, and this implies that the Treaty
is more than an agreement creating obligations only between
Member States. Accordingly the Community law, independent
of the legislation of the Member States, creates not only obli-
gations but also rights; these rights do not only originate from
explicit grants thereof by the Treaty, but also from obligations
which the Treaty imposes on other individuals and on Member
States and Institutions of the Community.
The decision affords a striking example of the role of the
Court of Justice in the creation of a European legal order.
Remedies Under Regulation 17
Under Regulation 17 the Commission has exclusive juris-
diction, subject to control by the Court, to exempt certain other-
wise restrictive agreements or practices from the prohibitions
of the Treaty. An adverse decision is subject to an action for
annulment under Article 173 of the Treaty or, if no decision is
made, for failure to give a decision under Article 175, and claims
for damages may be made under Article 176 and Article 215.
Fines and penalties levied by the Commission may be objected
to under Article 17 of Regulation 17 and Article 172, at which
14 The tariff in question was agreed upon by a protocol entered into be-
tween Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, ratified by the Nether-
lands in 1959 which by raising a duty on a certain chemical was in clear
violation of Article 12 of the EEC Treaty providing that Member States
shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new custom duties.
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time the inapplicability of the regulation may be raised under
Article 184.
Under Article 185 of the Treaty, an appeal to the Court from
a decision denying such exemption will not stay the effects there-
of, and the restrictive agreement or practice will be illegal until
the decision of the Commission is voided by the Court. A long
time may elapse between the time of the decision and the time
of the annulment. Considerable damage to the parties involved
could result therefrom. This may induce the Court to consider
carefully the effects of an annulment of a decision of the Com-
mission.
Under Article 3 of Regulation 17, affected private parties
may demand that the Commission investigate a violation of
Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty. Should such violation be
found, the Commission may order the enterprises involved to
cease and desist.
Many complaints have been filed with the Commission under
this provision, alleging the illegality of restrictive agreements,
particularly exclusive export and distribution agreements. Two
recent decisions of courts in Paris, the Cour de Cassation and
the Tribunal de Commerce de la Siene' 5 held that the national
judge had to suspend proceedings pending a decision of the Com-
mission. Both involved complaints by parties to an exclusive
export and distribution agreement against a third party who
had imported the same goods in violation of such agreement.
The defense in both cases was that the third party had filed a
demand under Article 3 of Regulation 17 and that the Commis-
sion had commenced proceedings thereunder. The Cour de
Cassation, held that proceedings ought to be suspended be-
cause the Commission had commenced proceedings and there-
by ousted the national court from jurisdiction. However it re-
fused to give effect to the restrictive agreement, pending the de-
cision of the Commission. The Tribunal de Commerce, although
also suspending the proceeding in the lower court, held that the
agreement was not invalid until the Commission had so decided,
and therefore it prohibited any violation of the agreement pend-
ing such decision.
Relief available to private parties under Article 3 of Regu-
lation 17 has developed into an important and unique means of
15 Cour de Cassation March 12, 1963; Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine
van March 5, 1963; REcueil Dalloz van May 29, 1963.
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bringing a violation of the rules of competition before the Com-
mission with recourse to the Court of Justice; a relief not based
on any express provision of the Treaty.
Conclusion
The decisions of the Court under the Rome Treaty cover
only a period of two years and any conclusions must therefore
be cautious. One can discern, however, a tendency, continuing
the trend under the ECCS Treaty, to strengthen the legal struc-
ture of the European Community by forcefully sustaining the
applicable Treaty provisions and the measures of its Institu-
tions both as to the duties created thereunder and the personal
rights that may be derived therefrom. On the other hand, the
Court has not hesitated to use its powers for the protection of
the subjects of the Community against illegal conduct of its In-
stitutions and of Member States in violation of the Treaty.
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